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Note
Balancing Private Property Rights with
Public Interests: Compensating Landowners for the
Use of Railroad Corridors for Fiber-Optic Technology
Jill K. Pearson*
The invention of fiber-optic cable' has resulted in a myriad
of benefits for consumers. In addition to improving the quality
of long-distance and cellular communication,2 fiber-optic tech-
nology has provided more efficient Internet access 3 and is
leading to significant advances in the visual entertainment in-
dustry.4 Companies like Sprint, Qwest, MCI, and AT&T, while
reaping the benefits of this fiber-optic revolution, must con-
tinually strive to keep up with the competition and consumer
demand in the fast-paced telecommunications market.5 In
* J.D. Candidate 2001, University of Minnesota Law School; BA., 1993,
University of Wisconsin at Eau Claire. The author would like to thank her
family for their continual support, Professor Ann Burkhart for her helpful
suggestions, and her editors for their time and advice.
1. Fiber-optic cable is an alternative to conventional metal cable and is
comprised of very fine strands of glass. See Philip Elmer-DeWitt, Take a Trip
into the Future on the Electronic Superhighway, TIME, Apr. 12, 1993, at 50, 53.
Fiber-optic cable has been described as "the most perfect transmitter of infor-
mation ever invented." Id.
2. See Stephen Koepp, London Calling, on a Beam of Light: Undersea
Fiber-Optic Cables Will Bring Continents Closer Together, TIME, Jan. 19, 1987,
at 52, 52 (indicating that in contrast to satellite connections, fiber-optic tech-
nology "delivers a comparatively pure sound"); Tyler Maroney, Info Pipelines,
TIME, Feb. 3, 1997, at 40, 40 (stating that, compared to traditional satellite
transmission, fiber-optic cable communication is "faster, cheaper, more reli-
able and subject to less interference").
3. See Karl Taro Greenfeld, Ma Everything! With One Astonishing Deal,
AT&T Hopes to Become a Communications Colossus-Again. This Is What It
May Mean for You, TIME, May 17, 1999, at 58, 60 (explaining that AT&T's use
of fiber-optic cable allows data to be transferred 50 to 100 times faster than
traditional Internet dial-up access).
4. See Elmer-DeWitt, supra note 1, at 51, 55 (discussing advances in ca-
ble television and video games made possible by fiber-optic cable).
5. See Brian O'Reilly, This Land Is Their Land. Maybe. Telecom's Real
Estate Problem, FORTUNE, July 5, 1999, at 30, 30-31 (implying that the "haste"
1769
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
their attempt to meet the needs of consumers, telecommunica-
tions companies face a common problem: finding available
space in which to bury their fiber-optic cable.6 One preferred
location is railroad corridors, which provide miles and miles of
uninterrupted linear tracts.7
Today, most telecommunications companies lease these
corridors from railroad companies that obtained easement
rights to the land over a century ago.8 However, the limited
nature of the railroad's property interest presents the question
whether railroads have the authority to apportion these rights
to third parties or whether that right ultimately belongs to pri-
vate property owners.9 Several state and federal courts have
addressed this matter but differ somewhat in their reasoning
and ultimate conclusions. 10 These differences, and a recent
outbreak of class action lawsuits by landowners against rail-
road and telecommunications companies," prompt a closer look
of telecommunications companies to install fiber-optic lines in a fraction of the
usual time may have been a factor leading to their current legal problems).
6. See, e.g., Feasibility of Allowing Fiber Optic Cable Along the Interstate
System, Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Econ. Dev. and the Subcomm.
on Surface Transp. of the Comm. on Pub. Works and Transp., 99th Cong., 219-
27 (1986) (statement of John F. Healy, Vice President, Network Planning,
AT&T) (explaining the great need for right-of-way space to support the grow-
ing fiber-optic industry) [hereinafter Joint Hearing].
7. See Danaya C. Wright & Jeffrey L. Hester, Pipes, Wires, and Bicycles:
Utility Licenses and the Shifting Scope of Railroad Easements from the Nine-
teenth to the Twenty-First Centuries, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. (forthcoming May 2000)
(manuscript at 42, on file with author). Railroad corridors, the narrow tracts
of land adjacent to the railroad tracks, are ideal for fiber-optic cable because of
their straight, level-grade quality. See id.; see also infra note 115 and accom-
panying text.
8. See discussion infra Part I.A.
9. Many of these historic easements were conveyed for railroad purposes
only; therefore, if the railroad company leases a portion of the easement land
for an unrelated commercial use, it may constitute a trespass. See infra notes
47-51 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., Mellon v. South Pac. Transp. Co., 750 F. Supp. 226 (W.D.
Tex. 1990); Davis v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 606 So. 2d 734 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1992), reh'g denied, 618 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 1993); Buhl v. U.S. Sprint Communi-
cations. Co., 840 S.W.2d 904 (Tenn. 1992). Differences in the results of these
cases are discussed infra Part I.C.5.
11. See Elizabeth Amon, Working on the RRs: Simple Property Case
Sparks 25 Class Actions Against RRs, Telecoms, NATL L.J., Aug. 16, 1999, at
Al; O'Reilly, supra note 5, at 30-31; see also Nels Ackerson, The Ackerson
Group (last modified Apr. 1, 2000) <httpJ/www.ackersonlaw.com> (providing
information on lawsuits involving railroad right of ways and identifying the
team of lawyers, led by Nels Ackerson, assisting landowners in their class ac-
tion suits against the federal government, railroads and telecommunications
1770 [Vol. 84:1769
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at the underlying issues and the possibility of a more uniform
solution that adequately recognizes the rights of the property
owner.
12
This Note considers the debate surrounding the leasing
agreements between the railroads and telecommunications
companies, and the rationales that have been advanced to ex-
cuse the resulting intrusion into the private property rights of
the landowner. Part I discusses the historical context and
property law concepts relevant to this debate, as well as the
case law regarding the scope of railroad easements. Part II
analyzes these decisions in light of the claims presented in the
current class action suits and generally argues that the prop-
erty rights of the individual are unjustifiably being ignored
when telecommunications companies bury their fiber-optic ca-
bles within railroad corridors without compensating landown-
ers. This Note concludes that private property owners must be
adequately reimbursed for this particular use of their land and
companies). The Ackerson Group, located in Washington, D.C., is currently
involved in twenty-five pending class actions. See E-mail from R. Andrew
Myers, Paralegal, The Ackerson Group, to Jill Pearson, Staff Member, Minne-
sota Law Review (Feb. 29, 2000) (on file with author).
12. The recognition of private property rights is advantageous for society
because it promotes efficient use of resources. See JESSE DUKEMINIER &
JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 53 (4th ed. 1998). This efficiency stems from the
innate human drive to acquire assets for the benefit of oneself and one's loved
ones; such a desire to accumulate wealth encourages productivity and respon-
sible use of resources. See Cass R. Sunstein, On Property and Constitutional-
ism, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 907, 911-12 (1993). Alternatively, "a system without
private property stifles incentives and thus induces sloth and waste." Id. at
912 (noting further that "[wihen property is unowned, no one has sufficient
incentive to use it to its full advantage or to protect it against exploitation").
Furthermore, private property has been said to serve the function of "nour-
ish[ing] individuality and healthy diversity," DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra, at
53-54, as well as allowing one to maintain "independence, dignity and plural-
ism in society by creating zones within which the majority has to yield to the
owner." Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 771 (1964).
Finally, protection of such rights has been viewed as a precondition for democ-
racy because citizens will be unwilling to participate in the process if they are
not assured of some degree of security against public intrusion. See Sunstein
supra, at 913-14. In fact, the Supreme Court once noted that "[d]ue protection
of the rights of property has been regarded as a vital principle of republican
institutions." Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,
235-36 (1897). But cf JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER
RIGHT, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 4, 9 (2d ed. 1998)
(indicating that despite constitutional protection against the taking of one's
property, citizens do not enjoy "absolute dominion" over it and that such pro-
tection "does not imply the unrestrained liberty to enjoy the maximum eco-
nomic advantages of property under all circumstances").
2000] 1771
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considers possible methods by which this could be accom-
plished.
I. THE HISTORY, NATURE AND SCOPE OF RAILROAD
EASEMENTS AND RIGHT OF WAYS
A. RAILROAD LAND ACQUISITION AND RESULTING PROPERTY
INTERESTS
Railroad companies acquired land for the construction of
their rail lines in a variety of ways. 13 Beginning in the mid-
1800s, federal and state grants provided private railroads with
public lands in anticipation of the significant societal benefits
that would result from improved transportation. 14 The General
Railroad Right-of-Way Act of 1875 further enabled railroad
companies to acquire public land on which to lay their tracks. 15
Conversely, railroads resorted to traditional real estate trans-
actions with individual landowners in order to obtain private
land within the proposed route. 16 As a consequence of these
negotiations, the railroads did not always acquire uniform
rights to the property over which their lines traversed.'7 Some
13. For a more thorough review of railroad land acquisition practices, see
Robert W. Swenson, Railroad Land Grants: A Chapter in Public Land Law, 5
UTAH L. REV. 456, 456-59 (1957); Wright & Hester, supra note 7 (manuscript
at 4-17). For state-specific information, see Jeffrey Alan Bandini, The Acquisi-
tion, Abandonment, and Preservation of Rail Corridors in North Carolina: A
Historical Review and Contemporary Analysis, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1989, 2009-17
(1997); Danaya C. Wright, Private Rights and Public Ways: Property Disputes
and Rails-to-Trails in Indiana, 30 IND. L. REV. 723, 725-28 (1997).
14. See 2 HOWE ET AL., THE AMERIcAN PEOPLE: CREATING A NATION AND
A SOcIETY 618 (Gary B. Nash & Julie Roy Jeffrey eds., 4th ed. 1998) (indicat-
ing that federal and state governments actively encouraged railroad construc-
tion by providing grants of public land); Swenson, supra note 13, at 456-59
(discussing railroad land-grant history); Wright & Hester, supra note 7
(manuscript at 5-6) (noting that state and federal governments came to the aid
of railroads in light of the great public benefits that would result from their
construction).
15. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 934-939 (1994) (stating that a right of way shall be
provided to railroad corporations through public lands of the United States for
the construction of the railroad). Although these right-of-way privileges were
once viewed as providing the railroad companies with a "limited fee" in the
property, it was subsequently held that the Act conveyed only an easement
right. See City of Aberdeen v. Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co., 602 F. Supp. 589,
592-93 (D.S.D. 1984) (discussing the Supreme Court's holdings in Rio Grande
W. Ry. Co. v. Stringham, 239 U.S. 44 (1915) and Great N. Ry. Co. v. United
States, 315 U.S. 262 (1942)).
16. See Wright & Hester, supra note 7 (manuscript at 6-7).
17. See infra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
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owners were willing to voluntarily relinquish title to that por-
tion of their land, speculating that the benefits of living in close
proximity to the railroad would soon outweigh the value of the
lost property.18 Others challenged the railroads, only to have
their land taken through formal condemnation proceedings. 19
The real estate transactions among the railroads and pri-
vate landowners often produced deeds that ambiguously de-
scribed the type of rights conveyed to the railroads. 20 Some
deeds vaguely referred to right-of-way privileges while others
transferred land explicitly limiting its use for railroad purposes
only.21 While common terminology such as fee or easement
may have been used, a single deed might reference more than
one seemingly incompatible type of interest, requiring consid-
eration of surrounding circumstances to determine the intent of
the parties.22
Because of the poorly worded deeds, state and federal
courts have had difficulty determining the precise nature of the
property interest owned by the railroads when one of the par-
ties litigates its rights under the deed.23 To illustrate the wide
range of property interests that could be implicated, courts
have relied on an analogy of property rights as a bundle of
sticks,24 with fee title absolute representing conveyance of all
18. See Wright & Hester, supra note 7 (manuscript at 6). At the time
railways were built, being located along a proposed route meant immediate
access to transportation and increased land values. See id.
19. See id. at 6-8. Railroads were given the authority to initiate eminent
domain proceedings as a result of federal, and later state, legislation; thus,
they were able to acquire property from willing and nonwilling sellers. See id;
see also Wright, supra note 13, at 725 (pointing out that a landowner's only
choice was to sell the land or have it taken under eminent domain).
20. See JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS
AND LICENSES IN LAND I 1.06[2][d], at 1-47, 1-48 (rev. ed. 1995) (addressing
the variety of language found in railroad conveyances making interpretation
problematic); see also Wright, supra note 13, at 725 (discussing the ambiguity
of railroad deeds).
21. See BRUCE & ELY, supra note 20, 1.0612][d], at 1-47.
22. See id. at 1-38; see also Bouche v. Wagner, 293 P.2d 203, 209-10 (Or.
1956) (en banc) (resorting to a consideration of the parties' intent because of
ambiguities in the language of the deed).
23. See, e.g., Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1532-37 (Fed. Cir.
1996); Buhl v. U.S. Sprint Communications Co., 840 S.W.2d 904, 906-10
(Tenn. 1992). Both cases required the court to interpret and analyze the lan-
guage of historic deeds in order to clarify the property interest at issue. See
also BRUCE & ELY, supra note 20, 1.0612][d], at 1-47. See generally A.E.
Korpela, Annotation, Deed to Railroad Company as Conveying Fee or Ease-
ment, 6 A.L.R.3d 973 (1966).
24. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (charac-
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the sticks and easement rights equivalent to a transfer of only
a few sticks. Despite this continuum of possibilities,25 the legal
debate in this context is often narrowed to whether the railroad
holds fee simple absolute title to the land or a more limited
easement right.26 If the railroad acquired the land in fee sim-
ple absolute, it would be entitled to the property described in
the deed "forever without limitation or condition."27 Thus, few
problems arise when the railroad establishes fee title owner-
ship because the railroad is free to use the land in virtually any
manner it sees fit. However, in those cases where it appears
only an easement has been granted, courts have struggled to
ascertain the scope of the railroad's rights to the land.2 8
B. THE NATURE OF EASEMENTS AND RIGHT OF WAYS
An easement is typically defined as "[an interest which
one person has in the land of another"29 and "gives no title to
the land upon which it is imposed."30 Essentially, it is the right
to use another's land, known as the servient estate,31 for a spe-
cific purpose32 and "does not displace the general possession of
the land by its owner."33 In light of this standard definition,
courts interpreting documents conveying land "for railroad
terizing property as a "bundle of rights" comprised of numerous individual
"sticks" such as the right to exclude).
25. For a discussion of the possible property interests created, see Wright
& Hester, supra note 7 (manuscript at 11-14); see also National Wildlife Fed'n
v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 850 F.2d 694, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (analyzing
the nature of railroad rights of way).
26. See Wright & Hester, supra note 7 (manuscript at 11). Historically, at
least with regard to the acquisition of public lands, the debate focused on
whether a right of way conveyed a fee with limitations or -an easement only.
See Rio Grande W. Ry. Co. v. Stringham, 239 U.S. 44, 47 (1915); N. Pac. Ry.
Co. v. Townsend, 190 U.S. 267, 271 (1903) (both referring to the interest ac-
quired as a result of railroad rights of way in terms of a hybrid-like "limited
fee made on an implied condition of reverter"). However, the Court later re-
ferred to the railroad's interest simply as an "easement." See Great N. Ry. Co.
v. United States, 315 U.S. 262, 270-72 (1942).
27. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 615 (6th ed. 1990).
28. See discussion infra Part I.C.
29. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 509 (6th ed. 1990).
30. Alvin v. Johnson, 63 N.W.2d 22, 27 (Mim. 1954).
31. See Schadewald v. Brul6, 570 N.W.2d 788, 795 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997);
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1369 (6th ed. 1990).
32. See Schadewald, 570 N.W.2d at 794 ("An easement is the right to use
the land of another for a specified purpose." (citation omitted)); BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 509 (6th ed. 1990).
33. Schadewald, 570 N.W.2d at 794.
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purposes only" have tended to find an easement right.3 4 Simi-
larly, instruments granting a "right of way"35 are generally held
to create mere easements.
36
Specifically, easements conveyed to the railroads for the
construction of their tracks are termed easements in gross.
Unlike an appurtenant easement 37 that benefits the possessor
of an adjacent tract of land, known as the dominant estate, 38 an
easement in gross belongs to the easement holder irrespective
of his ownership of any specific parcel of land.39 However, un-
like a typical easement in gross that exists totally separate and
independent of the land,40 the railroad easement is not purely
personal; rather, the easement is limited to a specific portion of
the servient estate.41 Thus, a railroad easement presents some
unique features that add to the already complicated process of
defining the boundaries of the property rights held by the rail-
roads and private property owners.
One such unique characteristic of a railroad easement is its
exclusive nature. 42 In this context, the term "exclusive" refers
34. BRUCE & ELY, supra note 20, 1 1.06[2][d], at 1-47.
35. The term "right of way," hereinafter used synonymously with the term
"easement," describes the right of a party to pass over land of another. See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1326 (6th ed. 1990). It may also describe the spe-
cific piece of land upon which a railroad constructs its railway. See Bouche v.
Wagner, 293 P.2d 203, 209 (Or. 1956) (en banc) (citation omitted).
36. See BRUCE & ELY, supra note 20, 1.06[1], at 1-39; see also State v.
Oregon Short Line R.R. Co., 617 F. Supp. 207, 212 (D. Idaho 1985) ("Congress,
in granting... rights-of-way, did not intend to convey to the railroads a fee
interest in the underlying lands."); supra notes 15, 26 (discussing historical
debate concerning whether railroads obtained a limited fee or a mere ease-
ment). But cf Bouche, 293 P.2d at 209-10 (concluding that the intent of the
parties implied that fee title in the land was passed even though the convey-
ance included the term "right of way").
37. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 453 (1944).
38. See Schadewald, 570 N.W.2d at 795; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 485-86
(6th ed. 1990).
39. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 454, § 454 cmt. a
(1944).
40. See id. § 454 cmt. a.
41. See, e.g., Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1534-35 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (examining language of the documents conveying particular "strip[s]" of
land to the railroad); Buhl v. U.S. Sprint Communications Co., 840 S.W.2d
904, 907 (Tenn. 1992) (specifying the tract of land granted for railroad pur-
poses).
42. See Wright & Hester, supra note 7 (manuscript at 22-26); see also
Midland Valley R. Co. v. Sutter, 28 F.2d 163, 166 (8th Cir. 1928) ("'[Ain ease-
ment for a railroad right of way differs in important respects from other ease-
ments, that the right of possession of the right of way is exclusive in the rail-
road....'" (quoting Chicago Great W. R. Co. v. Zahner, 177 N.W. 350, 351
20001 1775
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not to the number of different easements that may exist on the
particular tract of land, but instead describes the nature of the
railroad's possession in relation to the landowner.43 Typically,
the owner of a servient estate may continue to use the portion
of his land that is subject to an easement for any purpose so
long as it does not unreasonably interfere with the rights of the
easement holder.44 However, in the case of a railroad ease-
ment, the servient land owner is usually excluded from occu-
pying that portion of the property subject to the easement and
must even seek approval from the railroad to modify it.45 The
reasons for this arrangement are numerous but generally re-
volve around safety and liability concerns inherent in the rail-
road industry.46
Another distinguishing feature of a railroad easement is its
unique and limited purpose. While some easements provide
rather broad guidelines, allowing for any reasonable use that
(Minn. 1920))); Campbell v. Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co., 158 S.W. 1085, 1086
(Ark. 1913) (indicating that "[slo long as the railroad company occupied any
portion of its right of way, it had the exclusive use and right of control coex-
tensive with the boundary described in its deed").
43. See supra note 42; see also Henley v. Continental Cablevision of St.
Louis County, Inc., 692 S.W.2d 825, 828 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) ("[Ilnsofar as it
relates to the apportionability of an easement in gross, the term 'exclusive' re-
fers to the exclusion of the owner and possessor of the servient tenement from
participation in the rights granted, not to the number of different easements
in and over the same land.").
44. See Schadewald v. Bruld, 570 N.W.2d 788, 794 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997)
(stating that "[an easement does not displace the general possession of the
land by its owner...."); BRUCE & ELY, supra note 20, 1 8.04[1], at 8-28 ("The
owner of a servient estate may utilize the easement area in any manner and
for any purpose that does not unreasonably interfere with the rights of the
easement holder."); Marc A. Sennewald, The Nexus of Federal and State Law
in Railroad Abandonments, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1411 (1998) (same).
45. See Sennewald, supra note 44, at 1411 ("In the interest of safety,
among other reasons, a railroad easement is an exclusive use easement.");
Wright & Hester, supra note 7 (manuscript at 22-23) (citing Puett v. Western
Pac R.R. Co., 752 P.2d 213 (Nev. 1988) (per curiam), in which the owner of
land burdened by a railroad easement was required to obtain approval from
the railroad before a private grade crossing could be erected).
46. See Midland Valley, 28 F.2d at 167-68 (observing that "exclusive pos-
session is necessary to enable the railroad company to safely conduct its busi-
ness and meet the duty of exercising that high degree of care which the gen-
eral law and administrative rules enjoin upon it"); see also Brian P. Patchen,
Public Acquisition of Existing Right of Way, 40 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 477, 483 (1999)
(discussing the inherent dangers of railroad operations). A few states have
allowed exceptions to this rule of exclusivity, such as to allow for agricultural
uses when it is farmland that is burdened by the easement. See Wright &
Hester, supra note 7 (manuscript at 23).
1776 [Vol. 84:1769
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does not overly burden the servient estate,47 many railroad
easements are construed to permit use only for railway pur-
poses, even in the absence of an express provision to that ef-
fect.48 "Railway purposes" have been defined as those activities
related to the "construction, maintenance, or operation of the
railroad,"49 and have been held to include the erection of "side
tracks, building[s], telegraph lines, and other structures neces-
sary for its business."50 When the scope of an easement is lim-
ited in this way, an easement holder becomes a trespasser to
the extent that his use exceeds that which was authorized and
intended.5'
Railroad easements may also be differentiated from other
easements in the way in which they are terminated. In gen-
eral, once an easement is created it may endure forever in the
absence of any specified term or condition. 52 As a consequence
of the limited scope of a railroad easement, however, termina-
tion may result when the purpose for which it was originally
granted ceases to exist, even if the document failed to indicate
the parties' intent in this regard.53 Upon termination of the
easement, full rights to the parcel revert to the owner of the
47. See 25 AM. JUR. 2D Easements and Licenses in Real Property § 83
(1996). "Reasonable use" is not clearly defined but must be determined in
light of surrounding circumstances. Id.; see also BRUCE & ELY, supra note 20,
18.0211] [a], at 8-6 (stating, "[w]hat constitutes reasonable usage is a question
of fact."). But cf. Schadewald, 570 N.W.2d at 795 (adopting a more restrictive
view on the scope of easements prohibiting any new additional burden not
originally contemplated).
48. See BRUCE & ELY, supra note 20, 1.0612][d], at 1-49 (indicating that
a "railroad purpose" limitation may be implied by surrounding circumstances).
49. Buhl v. U.S. Sprint Communications Co., 840 S.W.2d 904, 910 (Tenn.
1992) (discussing the ruling in Mobile & O.R. Co. v. Postal Tel. Cable, 46 S.W.
571 (Tenn. 1898), that a railroad company may construct a telegraph line
along its right of way so long as it is used in the operation of the railroad).
50. Mellon v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 750 F. Supp. 226, 230 (W.D. Tex.
1990) (describing the various acceptable uses for a railroad right of way).
51. See BRUCE & ELY, supra note 20, 8.0315][a], at 8-24; see also Calu-
met Nat'l Bank v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 682 N.E.2d 785, 788 (Ind. 1997)
(defining trespass as the "unauthorized" use of another's land).
52. See BRUCE & ELY, supra note 20, 10.01, at 10-2 to 10-3.
53. See id. 1.0612][d], at 1-48 (stating that an easement for railway pur-
poses ends when it is no longer used for such purposes); id. 10.03[1], at 10-12
to 10-13 (discussing the "cessation of purpose doctrine"); see also State ex rel.
Fogle v. Richley, 378 N.E.2d 472, 474 (Ohio 1978) (per curiam) (noting that
although the language of a railroad easement may not specify a reversion in
the event of use for any other purpose, courts have held that use of the land
for other than railroad or public purposes results in a revival of fee owners'
rights).
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servient land.5 4 Such termination, however, may be compli-
cated by the concept of abandonment, 55 which requires a fur-
ther inquiry into the intended future use of the easement and
does not result simply from current nonuse.56 The process of
abandonment with respect to railroad corridors is regulated by
state and federal law, and will be discussed only peripherally in
this Note.57 This issue has become highly litigated in recent
years58 as a result of the government's efforts to slow the rate59
54. See City of Aberdeen v. Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co., 602 F. Supp. 589,
593 (D.S.D. 1984) (stating that "[a]s a mere easement, once a railroad ceases
using for railroad purposes a right-of-way... it disappears and the underlying
landowner has the use of property he already owns" (emphasis omitted)). In
D.C. Transit Systems, Inc. v. State Roads Commission, 270 A.2d 793, 801 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1970), the court stated that:
"The general rule is that the right and title to a mere easement in
land acquired by a quasi-public corporation, either by purchase, con-
demnation or prescription, for a public purpose is dependent upon the
continued use of the property for that purpose, and when such public
use is abandoned the right to hold the land ceases, and the property
reverts to its original owner or his successors in title."
(quoting Maryland & Pa. R.R. Co. v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 166
A.2d 247, 250 (Md. 1960)) (emphasis omitted). This effect is unique to railroad
easements as easements are not typically accompanied by a right of reverter.
See National Wildlife Fed'n v. ICC, 850 F.2d 694, 703 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
55. Abandonment occurs when an easement holder ceases to use the
easement and clearly indicates an intention to relinquish it by taking affirma-
tive action consistent with that intention. See BRUCE & ELY, supra note 20,
10.05[1], at 10-27. This Note will address only peripherally the installation
of fiber-optic cable in abandoned railroad lines.
56. See BRUCE & ELY, supra note 20, 10.03[1], at 10-14.
57. For a thorough discussion of railroad abandonment procedures, see
generally Charles H. Montange, Conserving Rail Corridors, 10 TEMP. ENVTL.
L. & TECH. J. 139 (1991); Sennewald, supra note 44, at 1399; Steven R. Wild,
A History of Railroad Abandonments, 23 TRANSP. L.J. 1 (1995).
58. This may be due in part to the momentum of the private property
rights movement. See ELY, supra note 12, at 154-55 (describing the renewed
push in the 1990s by private landowners for legislative relief from severe land
use controls). For a discussion on the resurgence of the "property rights" issue
from a political perspective, see generally John D. Echeverria, The Politics of
Property Rights, 50 OKRA. L. REV. 351 (1997). Many cases have resulted from
the 1983 enactment of the National Trails System Act (known as the Rails-to-
Trails Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (Supp. 1997)), which attempts to preserve rail-
road corridors through "railbanking," a process which allows their conversion
into recreational trails as an interim use pending possible future reactivation.
See BRUCE & ELY, supra note 20, 1.0612] [d], at 1-47 (noting that this issue is
frequently litigated); Wild, supra note 57, at 11-12. Landowners with rever-
sionary rights to the railroad property claim this non-railway use, in lieu of
full abandonment proceedings, constitutes a taking for which they are entitled
to compensation. See, e.g., Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1552
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (upholding the legislation but concluding that it could effect a
taking requiring just compensation if the railroad's interest in the property
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at which abandonment occurs and to preserve these rail lines
for potential future use.60 Many landowners view these delay
tactics as an intrusion on their reversionary rights,61 denying
them full use of their property and constituting a taking.62
C. THE SCOPE OF RAILROAD EASEMENTS
Presuming a railroad is granted an easement right that
has not yet been abandoned, questions about the nature of this
right still remain; primarily, defining the scope and allowable
uses of a railroad easement including the right of apportion-
ment, or division, of the easement.63 Although a review of case
was limited to an easement or right of way). For more information regarding
the concerns of these landowners and their pending lawsuits, see Implementa-
tion of the Rails to Trails Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on R.R.s of the
Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, 104th Cong., 152-72 (1997) [hereinafter
Hearings] (testimony of Jayne Glosemeyer, Richard Welsh and Nels Acker-
son); Ackerson, supra note 11; Richard Welsh, The National Association of Re-
versionary Property Owners (NARPO) (last modified Apr. 14, 2000) <http'J/
www.halycom.com/dick>.
59. See Montange, supra note 57, at 139 (noting that the rate of railroad
abandonments remains at a level of about 3000 miles per year). Railroads
seek to vacate unused tracks because of the financial drain caused by mainte-
nance obligations, property taxes and potential legal liability. See Sennewald,
supra note 44, at 1406 (explaining that one of the benefits of the Rails-to-
Trails Act is that it shifts such costs from railroad operators to willing organi-
zations).
60. See 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (Supp. III 1997) (stating the purpose behind
the statutory provision as the "furtherance of the national policy to preserve
established railroad rights-of-way for future reactivation of rail service"). For
a discussion on this and other methods by which the government has sought to
preserve railroad corridors, see Sennewald, supra note 44, at 1405-07; Wild,
supra note 57, at 11-13.
61. See Welsh, supra note 58 (providing information and a source of com-
munication for owners of reversionary property interests). But cf Sennewald,
supra note 44, at 1410 (criticizing "reversionary interest" terminology as an
inaccurate and improper characterization of the interest possessed by the
owner of a servient estate).
62. "Takings" claims refer to allegations that an action violates the Fifth
Amendment of the Constitution which provides that "No person shall be...
deprived of... property, without due process of law; nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
The purpose of the Takings Clause is to prevent the government from forcing
individuals to bear public burdens that, in all fairness, should be shared by
society as a whole. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
63. See Henley v. Continental Cablevision of St. Louis County, Inc., 692
S.W.2d 825, 827 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (discussing apportionment as the "divided
utilization" of easement rights); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES
§ 493 cmt. a (1944) (explaining that "[tihe apportioning of an easement in
gross consists in so dividing it as to produce independent uses or operations").
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law pertaining to railroad and similar easements reveals no
clear answers, it provides a foundation of doctrines and policies
from which to analyze the easement controversies that have
emerged with respect to the fiber-optic industry.
1. Mineral Rights
The scope of railroad easements with respect to mineral
rights is well established. Courts have consistently held that
landowners, rather than easement holders, retain the rights to
underground minerals.64 For instance, in United States v. Un-
ion Pacific Railroad,65 the Supreme Court held that the right of
way granted to the railroad under federal law for construction
of a railway and telegraph line over public lands did not include
mineral rights.6 6 The Court concluded that enjoining the rail-
road from drilling oil and gas on right-of-way land was proper
since such activity did not constitute a "railroad purpose"
within the meaning of the statute.67 Similar conclusions have
been reached even when the deed granting the right of way ex-
pressly included the right to take minerals. 68
Although landowners may retain an interest in the miner-
als underlying a railroad easement, their right to excavate and
exploit those minerals does not necessarily follow. There have
been two schools of thought in this area.69 Some jurisdictions
64. See United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 353 U.S. 112, 120 (1957); Right
of Way Oil Co. v. Gladys City Oil, Gas & Mfg., 157 S.W. 737, 739 (Tex. 1913).
But see United States v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 187 F.2d 374, 375 (7th Cir. 1951)
(contradicting the general rule denying railroad access to underground miner-
als).
65. 353 U.S. 112 (1957).
66. See id. at 120. Much of the Court's opinion focused on the interpreta-
tion of the "mineral lands" exception found within the federal statute granting
railroad rights of way. Id. at 114-18.
67. Id. at 114. But cf. Illinois Cent. R.R., 187 F.2d at 375, (finding that
the railroad's interest, described as "a limited fee subject to an implied condi-
tion of reverter" should the right of way cease to be used for railroad purposes,
was sufficient to entitle it to extract gas and oil from beneath the right-of-way
land).
68. See Right of Way Oil Co., 157 S.W. at 740 (Tex. 1913). The deed
granted a right of way "together with the right to take and use all the timber,
earth, stone, and mineral[s]... that may be found within [it]." Id. at 738 (em-
phasis added). But the deed's stated purpose of railroad operation was influ-
ential in the court's decision denying the railway company oil and other min-
eral rights in the right-of-way land. See id. at 739-40.
69. See Midland Valley R.R. v. Sutter, 28 F.2d 163, 165 (8th Cir. 1928)
(recognizing the split among the nation's courts with regard to concurrent uses
of right-of-way land). The Midland court adopted the majority approach and
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allow the owner of the servient estate to use the land in any
manner which does not interfere with its use for railroad pur-
poses.70 However, a majority of jurisdictions permit the rail-
roads to enjoy exclusive use and possession of the right of way,
allowing them to deprive the servient landowner of any use of
the land, including the landowners' right to exploit the miner-
als within the easement.71
2. Pipelines
Disputes over the rights to other subsurface uses, such as
the laying of underground pipeline, have also been a source of
litigation. For example, in Energy Transportation Systems, Inc.
v. Union Pacific Railroad,72 the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that the state, having been granted servient land for
school purposes, had sufficient rights to convey a pipeline
easement interest in the subsurface of the estate underlying a
railroad's right of way.73 Thus, in contrast to the general
weight of authority in the mineral rights cases, the court
deemed concurrent uses acceptable.74 Furthermore, the servi-
ent landowner, rather than the easement holder, was entitled
to subject the right-of-way parcel to more than one easement.75
In another case involving pipelines,76 private landowners
sought to enjoin two railroad companies from laying pipeline
necessary for the operation of their railroad switchyards.7 7 Be-
cause the railroad had the right of eminent domain to condemn
the right of way, the property owners were ultimately unsuc-
cessful in their efforts to obtain equitable relief.78 However, the
Tennessee Supreme Court acknowledged that laying the pipes
created an additional servitude upon the land 9 and concluded
awarded the railroad exclusive use of the land, enjoining landowners from en-
gaging in mineral-excavating activities. See id. at 168.
70. See id. at 165.
71. See id.
72. 619 F.2d 696 (8th Cir. 1980).
73. See id. at 699.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See Lea v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 188 S.W. 215 (Tenn. 1916).
77. See id. at 216.
78. See id. at 219. Eminent domain refers to the government's authority
to order transfers of property from owners to itself or other entities vested
with the power of eminent domain. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 12,
at 1102 n.3.
79. See Lea, 188 S.W. at 217.
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that such action amounted to a taking of private property for
public use.80
3. Telegraph and Telephone Lines
Beginning in the nineteenth century, cases emerged in-
volving whether shared use of railroad easements by telegraph
and telephone companies constituted an authorized use. De-
spite the seemingly vital connection between these utilities and
the initial operation of railroads, results in the courts were
mixed. In American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Smith,8 I the
Maryland Court of Appeals reviewed a decision of the trial
court in favor of ten landowners seeking to enjoin a telegraph
company from erecting its poles along the rail line without
their permission or consent. 82 The landowners complained that
such action was injurious to their property and constituted an
appropriation of private property for public use without com-
pensation8 3 The court, recognizing the necessity of compen-
sating landowners for any additional burden on their property
outside of the original easement, also acknowledged the useful-
ness of telegraph and telephone lines in the operation of a rail-
road, which would seem to fall within the intended purpose. 84
The court cautioned, however, that if the main objective in
erecting the lines was general commercial business, such action
would require a new easement. 85 Because the lines in this case
80. See id. at 219. The court recognized that there was not a consensus
among authorities at this time as to what constitutes a taking within the
meaning of statutes granting the right of eminent domain. See id. However,
the court dismissed the strict construction requiring a seizure, or direct dis-
possession of the owner, in favor of a rule providing that "'any destruction, re-
striction, or interruption of the common and necessary use and enjoyment of
the property in a lawful manner may constitute a taking.'" Id. (quoting 15
CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & PROCEDURE 652 (1905)). But cf. Campbell v. South-
western Tel. & Tel. Co., 158 S.W. 1085, 1086 (Ark. 1913). In Campbell, a tele-
graph company inadvertently erected three of ten telephone poles outside the
railroad right of way in which their activity was authorized. See id. Since the
intrusion of the fee owner's rights was claimed to be accidental, and the dam-
age could presumably be undone by relocation of the poles, not even nominal
damages were awarded. See id. at 1087.
81. 18 A. 910 (Md. 1889).
82. See id. at 911.
83. See id. at 912.
84. See id. at 913; see also Western Union Tel. Co. v. Rich, 19 Kan. 517,
518 (1878) (holding that a telegraph line used for railroad purposes is within
the scope of the railroad right of way and does not entitle landowner to further
damages).
85. See American Tel. & Tel., 18 A. at 913.
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were intended to primarily serve non-railroad customers, the
court upheld the trial court's injunctions concluding that this
additional burden constituted as much a taking for public use
as the original easement had, thus requiring that the landown-
ers be further compensated.8 6
Consistent with this holding, the Tennessee Supreme
Court in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Nashville, Chatta-
nooga & St. Louis Railway Co. 87 made it clear that an ease-
ment granted to a railroad is not as broad as the type of ease-
ment that a city has in its streets, and thus, did not authorize
the railroad to permit the erection of purely commercial tele-
graph lines along its right of way.88 The court followed what
had become the majority rule in holding that such activity im-
poses a further burden on the fee, entitling the landowner to
additional compensation from the telegraph company.8 9 The
court clarified the nature of the railroad right of way by quoting
Mobile Railroad v. Postal Telegraph Co. which stated that the
railroad "cannot license the appropriation of... such right of
way to private business purposes, nor to public purposes, ex-
cept so far as needful, and helpful to the operation of the
[rail]road itself."90
In contrast, some courts in more recent years have em-
ployed a "shifting public use" theory, holding that so long as the
land continues to be used for a public purpose the landowner is
not entitled to additional payment. 91 In State ex rel. Fogle v.
86. See id. at 914, 916; see also Potomac Edison Co. v. Routzahn, 65 A.2d
580, 585 (Md. 1949) (holding that erecting telephone lines on a railroad right
of way for use by the railroad itself is proper, but any general commercial
business use "constitutes an additional servitude upon the land... for which
the landowner is entitled to redress at law or by injunction").
87. 237 S.W. 64 (Tenn. 1922).
88. See id. at 65.
89. See id.
90. Id. (quoting Mobile & Ohio R.R. v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 46 S.W. 571
(Tenn. 1898)).
91. E.g., State ex rel. Fogle v. Richley, 378 N.E.2d 472, 475 (Ohio 1978)
(Celebrezze, J., concurring) ("The owner of the fee, who has received compen-
sation for a perpetual easement in the land, is in no position to require that
the public use continue precisely the same.... [I-Ile is not entitled to any com-
pensation for a change which did not in fact cause damage.'" (quoting NICHOLS
ON EMINENT DOMiAIN (rev. 3d ed. 1964)); 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 90
(1996) (indicating that other public uses may be made of railroad rights of
way). This "shifting public use" theory has provided justification for the con-
version of railroad tracks to recreation trails and the transition from telephone
poles to underground cable. Id. § 96 (noting that the right of eminent domain
granted to telegraph and telephone companies has been deemed applicable to
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Richley,92 the Ohio Supreme Court reviewed a case in which a
railroad company had acquired an easement over a tract of
land using its eminent domain power, providing just compensa-
tion to the landowner.93 Soon thereafter, the state brought an
action seeking to appropriate the railroad easement so that a
portion of the land could be used for the construction of a high-
way.94 After compensating the railroad, the state converted the
property into part of the public highway system.95 The land-
owners sought a writ of mandamus requiring the state to com-
mence a new condemnation action for this change in use of the
property owned by them in fee simple.9 6 They claimed the ac-
tion was necessary since the original taking was for the pur-
pose of constructing and operating a railroad only, a purpose
that had now been abandoned.97 The state, however, success-
fully argued that its taking of the railroad's easement interest
for highway purposes represented substantially the same
transportation use and that it did not create a greater burden
on the land.98 In other words, the public use of the easement
had simply shifted from a railway to a roadway, a use suffi-
ciently similar to justify a denial of additional compensation.99
4. Television Cable
Easement disputes involving cable companies address
many of the same issues that arise in railroad easement litiga-
tion. In this context, most courts have held that the addition of
a new appurtenance, such as cable wire, to existing exclusive
easements is permissible. For example, in Henley v. Continen-
tal Cablevision of St. Louis County, Inc.,10° the Missouri Court
of Appeals examined the nature of easements conveyed to a
telephone and an electric company and considered whether
they were apportionable.' 0 1 Plaintiffs, as trustees of the servi-
ent land, claimed that the easement privileges were not in-
fiber-optic telephone cable).
92. 378 N.E.2d 472 (Ohio 1978).
93. See id. at 473.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id. at 474.
98. See id. at 475.
99. See id.
100. 692 S.W.2d 825 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
101. See id. at 827.
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tended to be shared with third parties and sought an injunction
and compensation following the discovery that television cables
had been erected upon the easements. 10 2 The utility compa-
nies, on the other hand, contended that because these ease-
ments were exclusive in nature they were subject to division;
therefore, they had the right to grant the cable company a li-
cense to enter and run its wires over the land. 0 3 Rejecting the
landowner's argument and affirming the circuit court's dis-
missal of the action, the court of appeals concluded that even
though the easements did not mention television cables, the
language was broad enough to support this use.1o4 Further-
more, the court held the addition of the cable to the already
existing poles did not increase the burden on the servient es-
tate beyond that originally authorized and intended.'0 5 The ex-
clusive nature of the utility easement also led to a presumption
of apportionability, further strengthening the court's determi-
nation that consent of and payment to the landowner was un-
necessary. ,06
Several years later in Centel Cable Television v. Cook, 0 7
the Ohio Supreme Court also held that the stringing of a cable
by a television company along a public utility easement was
allowable and did not increase the burden already imposed on
the servient estate because the uses were sufficiently similar. 08
While acknowledging that apportionability of an easement de-
pends upon the intention of the parties, the court held that
easement rights could be partially assigned to a third party
even when the grantor was silent regarding his intent. 0 9 Like
the Missouri Court of Appeals in Henley, the Ohio Supreme
Court relied in part on the presumption that apportionment is
allowed where the easement rights granted are exclusive of the
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id at 829 (indicating that the expressed intention of the easement
was to "obtain for the homeowners ... the benefits of electric power and tele-
phonic communications" which the court of appeals concluded should extend to
unforeseen technological advances in visual and audio communication).
105. See id. at 828.
106. See id. at 829. This presumption rests upon the rationale that since
the landowner is already excluded from using the servient land, he sustains no
additional loss if the easement holder shares his right with others. See id. at
827.
107. 567 N.E.2d 1010 (Ohio 1991).
108. See id. at 1015.
109. See id. at 1013.
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servient owners' participation therein. 110 Furthermore, the
court employed a rule of construction allowing for divided utili-
zation of such rights when it increases the value of the ease-
ment to the holder."' Because the cable company's use of the
poles meant additional revenue for the utility easement holder,
application of this rule granted them a right to apportion."12
5. Fiber-Optic Cables
The most recent area of contention yet to be resolved with
regard to the scope of railroad easements focuses on the con-
tractual relationships between telecommunications companies
and railroads for partial use of railroad easement rights for the
purpose of burying fiber-optic cable. 113 Fiber-optic cables are
preferred to conventional metal cables because they can trans-
mit information at a much greater speed, 114 however, their
technological design requires that they be buried in long,
straight, uninterrupted tracts of land.115 The trans-continental
quality of railroad easements and the urgent need for subsur-
face cable space led to negotiations between the railroads and
telecommunications giants such as AT&T, MCI, Qwest, and
Sprint Communications. 1 6 Dealing with the railroads ap-
pealed to these companies because it was much simpler to
agree to terms with one entity than with thousands of individ-
ual landowners. 117 Within the last decade, however, property
owners along the rail lines became increasingly aware that the
110. See id. at 1014 (citing Henley v. Continental Cablevision of St. Louis
Cty., Inc., 692 S.W. 2d 825, 827 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985)).
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See Amon, supra note 11, at A12; O'Reilly, supra note 5, at 30-31.
114. See Joint Hearing, supra note 6, at 44-45 (noting that fiber-optic ca-
bles are smaller and more efficient than metal cables).
115. See id. at 50 (explaining that information is passed through fiber-optic
cables via pulses of laser light). Since bends in the cable may interfere with
the laser light pulses, the long, straight tracts of land that make up railroad
corridors are especially attractive to telecommunications companies. See
Wright & Hester, supra note 7 (manuscript at 42).
116. See O'Reilly, supra note 5, at 30 (reporting that, "[uin their haste to
install tens of thousands of miles of fiber-optic lines, telecom companies have
paid millions to pipeline companies and electric utilities, as well as the rail-
roads, for permission to use the rights of way"). The number of miles of cable
installed by the telecommunications companies varies: 45,000 for MCI World-
Coin, 18,815 for Qwest, and 30,000 for Sprint. See Amon, supra note 11, at
A12.
117. See O'Reilly, supra note 5, at 31.
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railroads were profiting from their land in ways that may not
have been contemplated by the creators of the underlying
easements. 118 This led to the filing and subsequent certifica-
tion of several class action lawsuits beginning in 1992.119 These
certified classes of landowners brought claims of trespass,
slander of title, and unjust enrichment. 120 To date, only one
class action suit has settled.121
While the publicity surrounding these class actions against
the railroads and telecommunications companies may suggest
that this fact pattern is a completely novel one, several jurisdic-
tions have already addressed these issues.122 In Mellon v.
South Pacific Transport Co., 123 a federal court for the Western
District of Texas considered whether a railroad could grant a
telecommunications company an easement for installation of its
fiber-optic cable beneath its right of way without compensating
118. Although the landowners claim that the original grants conveyed only
an easement right, in some cases this remains a point of contention. See, e.g.,
Amon, supra note 11, at A12 (indicating that AT&T maintains the position
that the railroad owns the land in fee simple).
119. See id.
120. See The Ackerson Group, Landowners Nationwide Class Action
Against AT&T (Aug. 21, 1998) (visited Mar. 3, 2000) <http'//www.ackersonlaw.
com/pr02.html>. The trespass claim likely results from allegations that the
railroad exceeded the scope of its easement. See notes 47-51 and accompany-
ing text. Slander of title, defined as an act in which a false statement is made
"in disparagement of a person's title to real or personal property," would coin-
cide with the landowners' contention that the railroads disregarded their fee
ownership when they leased the corridors to telecommunications companies.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1388 (6th ed. 1990). Finally, the unjust enrichment
claim evidences the landowners' belief that the railroads have "retain[ed]
money or benefits which in justice and equity" belong to them. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1535 (6th ed. 1990).
121. See O'Reilly, supra note 5, at 30 (indicating that a partial settlement
was reached in one of the class actions based in Indiana when AT&T agreed to
pay $45,000 per mile to landowners); E-mail from R. Andrew Myers to Jill
Pearson, supra note 11 (confirming settlement of only one class action lawsuit
thus far).
122. See Davis v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 606 So. 2d 734, 738 (D. Fla. 1992)
(holding that a Florida statute gave the telephone company eminent domain
power to lay fiber-optic cable in the railroad corridor without obtaining land-
owner permission); Mellon v. South Pac. Transp. Co., 750 F. Supp. 226, 229-30
(W.D. Tex. 1990) (finding that Texas law allows the incidental use of railroad
rights of way for telephone and telegraph lines, as well as modem-day fiber-
optic cable). But see Buhl v. U.S. Sprint Comm. Co., 840 S.W.2d 904, 932
(Tenn. 1992) (reasoning that the installation of underground cable for com-
mercial purposes is an impermissible use of railroad rights of way).
123. 750 F. Supp. 226 (W.D. Tex. 1990).
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the owner of the servient estate. 124 The buried cable provided
communication services to both the railroad and to public cus-
tomers. 125 Although Mellon argued that this third-party use
constituted an additional burden on the railroad's easement for
which he should be compensated, the court disagreed and
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. 126
The Mellon court relied upon the "incidental use" doctrine,
a concept that broadens the scope of authorized right-of-way
uses and allows railroads to contract with third parties. 127 The
Texas courts adopted this doctrine in the early 1900s as a
means of granting approval for the erection of telegraph and
telephone lines on right-of-way property.128 Based on the doc-
trine, the Mellon court reasoned that the telecommunication
company's incidental use was acceptable because it facilitated
the business of the railroads. 129 Although it acknowledged pre-
vious case law denying railroads mineral rights in the ease-
ment estate, the court concluded that application of the inci-
dental use doctrine extended to below ground uses of the right
of way.130 Furthermore, the Mellon court theorized that the fi-
ber-optic cable was simply the modern day equivalent of the
telegraph line. 131 Because laying fiber-optic cable within the
easement land was not inconsistent with the purposes for
which the right of way was granted, the Mellon court deemed
this use of the land acceptable. 132
In Davis v. MCI Telecommunications Corp.,133 the District
Court of Florida reached a similar conclusion, although it re-
jected the incidental use doctrine. The Davises, owners of the
servient land, contended that MCI acted illegally when it failed
to obtain permission or to compensate them before laying cable
along an existing railroad right of way. 34 In an opinion largely
124. See id. at 228.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 233.
127. Id. at 229.
128. See id. at 230 (citing Ft. Worth & R.G. Ry. Co. v. Southwestern Tel. &
Tel. Co, 71 S.W. 270, 275 (Tex. 1903)).
129. See id.
130. See id. (recognizing the Supreme Court's conclusion in United States v.
Union Pac. R.R., 353 U.S. 112 (1957), that the railroad generally cannot make
use of minerals found within its right of way).
131. See id. at 230-31.
132. See id.
133. 606 So. 2d 734 (D. Fla. 1992).
134. See id. at 735.
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devoted to resolving issues of statutory interpretation, the
Florida court ultimately affirmed the circuit court's judgment
dismissing the claim. 135 Instead of employing the incidental
use theory, the court relied on a state law granting telephone
companies eminent domain power to construct their telephone
lines. 136 The controlling statute, taken within its historical con-
text,137 had the practical effect of adding telecommunication
privileges to all Florida railroad rights-of-way. 138  Conse-
quently, although the cable was being used primarily for non-
railroad purposes, 139 MCI was permitted to maintain its cable
without compensating the Davises. 140
While the outcomes in the above cases seem to minimize
the importance of private property rights relative to the ac-
commodation of technological advances, a case decided in the
same year as Davis appears to be more sympathetic to the in-
terests of the fee owner. In Buhl v. U.S. Sprint Communica-
tions Co.,14 1 three landowners brought an action against a tele-
phone company claiming that the installation of fiber-optic
cable within the existing railroad rights of way constituted a
taking under the law of eminent domain.142 Sprint installed
the cables pursuant to an agreement with the railroad in which
annual payment was made on a per-mile basis. 143 After deter-
mining that the plaintiffs held fee title to the land,1' leaving
the railroad with a limited easement interest, the Tennessee
Supreme Court concluded that the installation of the cable
without the landowner's consent amounted to a taking of the
property for which he was entitled to compensation. 145
135. See id. at 738.
136. See id. at 737 (referring to FLA. STAT. § 362.02 (1989) which reads, in
part: "[amny [organized] telegraph or telephone company... shall have the
right to construct, along and upon the right-of-way of any railroad in the state,
and to that end is granted all powers for the exercise of the right of eminent
domain").
137. See id. at 736 (noting that, "[a] nexus between railroad and commer-
cial telegraph facilities is found throughout the historical record").
138. See id. at 737.
139. See id. at 735.
140. See id. at 738.
141. 840 S.W.2d 904 (Tenn. 1992).
142. See id. at 905.
143. See id. at 906 (describing the "license agreement" whereby Sprint
agreed to pay Southern Railway for the right to lay its fiber-optic cable under
its right of way at a cost of $1,200 per mile per year for a term of 25 years).
144. See id. at 908-09.
145. See id. at 913.
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In reaching its decision, the court acknowledged the great
latitude imparted to railroads with respect to the uses of their
rights of way: "[T]he easement for railroad purposes includes
the right to allow third parties to use portions of its right of
way provided such use is not inconsistent with and does not in-
terfere with the railroad's use of the property."146 However, the
court emphasized that this right is conditioned upon the addi-
tional requirement that the third party's use be "'needful and
helpful to the operation of the [railroad itself.'" 147 Ultimately,
the court concluded that because the cable installed by Sprint
was not in any way related to railroad business, plaintiffs were
entitled to compensation.1 48
II. DISMISSING JUSTIFICATIONS FOR INFRINGEMENT
AND RESTORING LANDOWNERS' RIGHTS
Although it may be difficult to reconcile the holdings of
Mellon, Davis, and Buhl149 into consistent rules of law and ap-
ply them to the recent class action suits, these cases, and the
others discussed above, help to identify some of the relevant is-
sues that deserve consideration. One of the factors complicat-
ing the analysis is the influence of state law in the determina-
tion of whether the landowner is entitled to additional
compensation for certain uses of right-of-way land.150 The ma-
jority of jurisdictions appear to be leaning toward allowing rail-
roads to lease unused portions of their right of ways to tele-
communications companies, 51 perhaps considering the strong
public interest served by encouraging improvements in the
telecommunications industry. This tendency, however, un-
146. Id. at 910.
147. Id. (quoting Mobile & Ohio R.R. v. Postal Tel. Co., 46 S.W. 571, 572
(1898)).
148. See id. at 913.
149. See Wright & Hester, supra note 7 (manuscript at 44) (concluding that
it is impossible to harmonize Mellon, Davis, and Buhl).
150. See, e.g., Mellon v. South Pac. Transp. Co., 750 F. Supp. 226, 231
(W.D. Tex. 1990); Buhl v. U.S. Sprint Comm. Co., 840 S.W.2d 904, 913 (Tenn.
1992). The court in Mellon found influential a Texas law giving telephone
companies "preferred utility" status, allowing them to condemn a right of way
over railroad property without compensating landowners for the additional
burden. Mellon, 750 F. Supp. at 231 (citing TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
1416, 1417 (West 1980)). In the absence of a similar Tennessee law, the court
in Buhl held that use of railroad right-of-way land by the telecommunications
company without the landowners consent constituted a taking for which they
were entitled to payment. See Buhl, 840 S.W.2d at 913.
151. See Wright & Hester, supra note 7 (manuscript at 47).
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avoidably infringes on the property owner's right to control the
use of his land and those who enter upon it, striking at the
heart of the historically protected liberties inherent in property
ownership. 52
A. THE PROBLEM WITH TELECOM'S USE OF RAILROAD
CORRIDORS
1. Fiber-Optic Cables Are Not Simply "Modern Day
Telegraphs"
Previous decisions, such as Mellon, justify the infringe-
ment on private property rights by examining the past practice
of granting telephone and telegraph companies access to rail-
road corridors. 53 Under this reasoning, fiber-optic cables are
viewed as simply the modern-day equivalent of the telephone
and telegraph, 5 4 therefore, their installation does not present
any new or troubling issues regarding access. Reminiscent of
the "sifting public use" concept, 155 the telecommunication
companies' intrusion is excused as sufficiently similar to that
which was deemed acceptable in the past. However, the
placement of fiber-optic cables along a rail line presents a new
and different use for several reasons.
First, the societal context in which the advancement of fi-
ber-optic technology has emerged is significantly different from
that which existed at the time the telegraph and telephone
were introduced in the nineteenth century. Back then, Amer-
ica was in the throes of an industrial revolution, requiring ac-
companying changes in transportation and communication to
facilitate the transition from a primarily agricultural economy
to one increasingly dependent on an expanding business and
entrepreneurial market.156 Just as the construction of railroads
152. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,
435 (1982) ("The power to exclude has traditionally been considered one of the
most treasured strands in an owner's bundle of property rights" (citing Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979)).
153. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
155. See State ex rel. Fogle v. Richley, 378 N.E.2d 472 (Ohio 1978) (per cu-
riam); discussion supra Part I.C.3.
156. See JAMES A. HENRETTA ET AL., AMERICA'S HISTORY SINCE 1865, at
513-14, 553-54 (1987) (describing the emergence of an industrial economy, the
importance of the railroads to industry, and how the telephone facilitated
business by connecting "urban decision makers"); 2 HOWE ET AL., supra note
14, at 616, 618 (indicating that "the completion of a national transportation
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represented a momentous advance in transportation, 157 the in-
vention and installation of the telegraph and telephone lines
were significant developments in the communications indus-
try.158 Although private property interests were of no less im-
portance in that era, they were seemingly outweighed by the
public interest in supporting this new mode of communication
and finding a means to justify its development and implemen-
tation. 159 In contrast, the fiber-optic revolution of today, while
certainly introducing advances in information transmission is,
nonetheless, simply an improvement. 160 The traditional means
of communication is still functional, thus there is little, if any,
need in today's market for government intervention and promo-
tion of fiber-optic technology at the expense of the rights of
property owners.
Furthermore, at the turn of the twentieth century there
was a necessary connection between the operation of the rail-
roads and the telegraph and telephone lines erected along its
corridors: railroads depended on communication through the
lines to safely and effectively carry out their business. 161 How-
and communications network was central to economic growth" and recognizing
the key role of railroads in rising productivity and big business).
157. See HENREITAETAL., supra note 156, at 514 (indicating that railroads
were "far better" than their predecessors, barges and riverboats, at providing
rapid, reliable transportation); 2 HOWE ET AL., supra note 14, at 618 (identi-
fying railroads as the "pioneers of big business and a great modernizing force
in America"); see also BOSTON CITY COUNCIL, THE RAILROAD JUBILEE 5 (1852)
(providing an account of the celebration marking the opening of the railroad
between Boston and Canada, referring to the accomplishment as a "mighty
work" and "final triumph").
158. See HENRETTA ET AL., supra note 156, at 554 (indicating that the tele-
phone "sped up communication beyond anything imagined previously"); JASON
H. SILVERMAN, AMERIcAN HISTORY BEFORE 1877, at 169-70 (1989) (describing
both the railroad and the telegraph as "technological marvel[s]" and noting
that, along with the railroads, "the telegraph dramatically expedited the speed
with which information traveled").
159. A similar balancing of interests, ultimately favoring the interest of the
public, was evidenced by the government's willingness to grant land and emi-
nent domain powers for railroad construction. See supra notes 14, 19 and ac-
companying text.
160. See supra notes 1-3, 115 and accompanying text (identifying the im-
proved characteristics of fiber-optic communication over traditional metal wire
and satellite communication).
161. See VINCENT REH, RAILROAD RADIO 3-6 (1996) (noting that dispatch-
ers relied on telegraphed information regarding a train's location for safe and
efficient routing); see also Railroad Safety Hearings, Hearing on S. 539 and S.
1401 Before the Senate Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 83rd
Cong., 4-5 (1953) (letter from Charles D. Mahaffie, Acting Chairman of the
Committee on Legislation and Rules, Interstate Commerce Commission, dated
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ever, modern-day fiber-optic cables running along the railways
are not necessary for the railroad's operation, and although
cellular phone use by railroads has increased in recent years,
many railroads continue to rely on various radio networks for
reliable and effective communication. 62 In short, it is difficult
to justify this underground cable as "modern-day" telegraph
lines crucial for the railroad industry. Moreover, the incidental
use doctrine upon which courts previously relied 63 has lost its
merit over the years. Fiber-optic technology is not necessary to
facilitate the business of the railroads as telegraphs and tele-
phones once were, thus, use of the easement land for this new
technology is not merely "incidental" and should not be excused
by a broad interpretation of the authorized scope of the ease-
ment.164
2. "For Railroad Purposes" Excuse Is Not Sufficiently Limiting
While cases such as Buhl indicate that the scope of the
railroad easement is not unlimited, they hint that even mini-
mal use of fiber-optic technology by the railroad is sufficient to
justify an intrusion of the servient landowner's rights. Al-
though the Buhl court did not expressly consider whether
Sprint's laying of fiber-optic cables in the railroad corridors still
would have constituted a taking under such circumstances, the
court relied on authority holding that an appurtenance could be
within the scope of the railroad easement, "even though it was
beneficial to others also."16 5 Similar to the Mellon court, the
Mar. 10, 1953) (noting that the telegraph and telephone are among those sys-
tems contributing to increased safety in railroad operations and urging legis-
lation authorizing the Interstate Commerce Commission to make mandatory
the installation of certain railroad communication systems); GEORGE H.
DRURY, THE HISTORICAL GUIDE TO NORTH AMERicAN RAILROADS 8-9 (1985)
(describing the impact of technology on the railroads from 1870-1910, includ-
ing the instant communication the telegraph provided).
162. See REH, supra note 161, at 21-56 (discussing modem railroad radio
communication systems and their use in rail operations); Steve Grande,
Trainweb (visited Apr. 16, 2000) <http://www.trainweb.com> and <http'J/www.
trainweb.com/radio> (providing information and resources pertaining to the
professional rail industry including details on radio communication and fre-
quencies).
163. See, e.g., Mellon v. South Pac. Transp. Co., 750 F. Supp. 226, 229
(W.D. Tex. 1990).
164. See id. (describing the underlying rationale of the incidental use doc-
trine).
165. Buhl v. U.S. Sprint Comm. Co., 840 S.W.2d 904, 911 (Tenn. 1992) (ref-
erencing the court's findings in both Grand Trunk R.R. v. Richardson, 91 U.S.
454 (1875) and City of Knoxville v. Kaiser, 33 S.W.2d 411 (Tenn. 1930)). The
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Buhl court distinguished between lines of communication used
solely for non-railroad purposes and those benefiting the rail-
road to some degree. 166 Thus, any appurtenance even mini-
mally advantageous to the railroad could seemingly be justified
under the purpose of the easement since it is in some way re-
lated to the "construction, maintenance, and operation of the
railroad."'167
Arguably, from a public policy perspective, the reasoning of
the Buhl and Mellon courts is flawed because it permits rail-
roads to defend their profitable contractual relationships with
telecommunications companies on the basis of what may be an
imperceptible amount of actual railroad use in comparison to
the wealth of general commercial business conducted on the fi-
ber-optic cables. In short, the "railroad purposes" may be
minimal compared to the public's use of these lines. Consider-
ing some of these tracks may not even be active, 168 the railroad
connection becomes even more tenuous.
3. No Additional Burden Does Not Mean No Misuse of the
Easement
Despite potential abuse of the "railroad purposes" justifica-
tion, some might argue that even if the fiber-optic cables are
being utilized only negligibly for railroad purposes, the land-
owner is not entitled to any compensation because the use does
not constitute an additional burden on the servient land.16 9
This reasoning was evident in the cable television cases. 170
Nevertheless, courts have found misuse, even in the absence of
an increased encumbrance on the property, in the context of
appurtenant easements. For example, in Brown v. Voss,17 1 a
court continued:
"It is almost everywhere held that the erection of a line of telegraph
over the right of way of a railroad company, not to be used in the op-
eration of the railroad, but for purely commercial purposes, imposes
an additional burden on the fee, and the landowner is entitled to ad-
ditional compensation from the telegraph company."
Id. at 912 (quoting from Western Union Tel. Co. v. Nashville, Chattanooga &
St. Louis Ry., 237 S.W. 64 (1921)) (emphasis added).
166. See id. at 911-12.
167. Id. at 910.
168. Many rail lines are being maintained simply as a result of government
preservation programs and not because of current use. See supra notes 58-60
and accompanying text.
169. See discussion supra Part I.C.4.
170. See discussion supra Part I.C.4.
171. 715 P.2d 514 (Wash. 1986).
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landowner was granted an appurtenant easement across his
neighbor's property in order to reach his land.'7 2 Subsequently,
the landowner purchased an adjacent lot, expanding the size of
his residential estate. 73 Although he utilized the driveway
easement no more than before this acquisition,174 frustrating
the "additional burden" theory, the Washington Supreme Court
held that such use exceeded the scope of the easement. 75
Similar facts were presented in Schadewald v. Brul. 176 Unlike
Brown, in which the court ultimately determined damages to
be insubstantial, 7 7 the Michigan Court of Appeals in Schade-
wald granted an injunction to stop misuse of the easement,
concluding that the trial court erred in denying relief simply
because there was no evidence of an increased burden on the
servient property 78 Thus, failing to show a further encum-
brance on the land does not necessarily preclude a claim for
unauthorized use of an easement.
Furthermore, the argument that the use places no addi-
tional burden on the servient estate is easier to accept in cases
in which telephone and electric companies are apportioning
their easement rights to cable television companies than in the
fiber-optic cases. In the former situation, such division merely
results in an additional wire being placed on already existing
telephone and electrical poles.'79 Although this violates the
rights of the landowner to exclude others from his property, its
disruptiveness is minimal. On the other hand, digging new
trenches for fiber-optic cable is a substantial intrusion. The
172. See id. at 515.
173. See id.
174. See id. at 518.
175. Id. at 517.
176. 570 N.W.2d 788 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997). In this case, the dominant
landowner built a garage on the tract of land neighboring that served by the
appurtenant easement. See id. at 792. Subsequently, the servient landowner
sought an injunction against the dominant landowner and the township
claiming that the variance granted for the construction of the garage and the
use of the easement to access the additional tract of land constituted an un-
constitutional taking. See id. at 793.
177. See Brown v. Voss, 715 P.2d 514, 517-18 (Wash. 1986) (recalling the
$1 award of the trial court that was not challenged on appeal and affirming
the trial court's denial of an injunction). However, additional factors such as
comparative hardship to the parties and questionable incentives behind the
claims may have influenced the court's conclusions in this case. See id. at 518.
178. See Schadewald, 570 N.W.2d at 796.
179. See, e.g., Henley v. Continental Cablevision of St. Louis County, Inc.,
692 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Centel Cable Television Co., 567
N.E.2d 1010, 1012 (Ohio 1991).
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court in Henley, considering the addition of television cable to
an existing easement, acknowledged this difference by con-
cluding that the plaintiffs' reliance on precedent involving un-
derground cable was misplaced: "Obviously, excavation upon a
homeowner's property for the installation of underground cable
poses a much greater burden than the attachment of an aerial
cable to existing poles." 80
4. Exclusive Easements Are Not Per Se Apportionable
Even if use of the railroad easement by telecommunica-
tions companies is not specifically within its scope, cases in-
volving the apportionment of utility easements might suggest
that its exclusive nature creates a presumption that such ac-
tion is permissible. 81 As the Missouri Court of Appeals ex-
plained in Henley, the underlying rationale for this rule is that
if the owner of the servient land does not retain the right to oc-
cupy the land concurrent with the easement holder, he sustains
no loss if the easement is shared with others. 18 2 As also noted
by the court, however, this right is subject to the specifications
expressed in the grant. 8 3 Although the railroad easements do
provide some latitude regarding the measures that may be
taken to support the construction and operation of the railroad,
they typically do not provide rights to the railroads' "successors
and assigns" as explicitly stated in the utility easements. I8 4
Consequently, this argument fails when applied to railroad
easements, even though they are exclusive in nature.
180. Henley, 692 S.W.2d at 828.
181. See, e.g., id. at 827 (holding that when the rights granted to an ease-
ment owner are exclusive in nature, apportionment by the easement owner is
"presumptively allowable").
182. See id.
183. See id.; see also RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES, § 493
(1944) ("The apportionability of an easement in gross is determined by the
manner or the terms of its creation."). Comment c of § 493 further indicates
that while the owner of an exclusive easement has the sole privilege of making
use of it, the possessor of the servient land "is affected in some degree by any
increase in the use authorized by [it]. He is entitled, therefore, to prohibit any
use made under it in excess of that authorized by the manner or terms of its
creation." Id.
184. Henley, 692 S.W.2d at 828.
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5. Flexible Interpretation of Easements Should Not Extend to
Newly-Created Property Interests Outside Its Scope
Critics of the litigation against telecommunications and
railroad companies argue that easements should not be inter-
preted so narrowly as to limit their application in light of new
technology. 85 Accordingly, the critics contend that the rights
and privileges contemplated at the time the easement was cre-
ated should not strictly dictate the future scope of the interest
conveyed but should allow for "'the natural evolution of com-
munications technology." 86 While it is certainly hard to dis-
pute the importance of scientific progress, this does not necessi-
tate a result in which the landowner's rights are totally
eclipsed.
The primary issue currently being litigated in the fiber-
optic cases is not whether new technology should be stifled, or
whether telecommunications companies should be forced to
look elsewhere for land in which to bury their cable, but rather
who is best positioned to claim ownership of this novel interest,
this new "stick" in the bundle of property rights. 8 7 The ease-
ments granted to railroad companies over a century ago were
limited to the purpose of establishing and maintaining a sys-
tem of transportation 8 8 and surely did not contemplate a soci-
ety obsessed with obtaining more efficient Internet access and
clearer cellular phone communication. The scope of allowable
uses was made sufficiently broad to give railroads the freedom
to take measures necessary for safe, reliable, and efficient
185. See, e.g., id. at 829 ('Just as we must accept scientific advances, we
must translate the rights of parties to an agreement in the light of such devel-
opments'" (quoting Crowley v. New York Tel. Co., 363 N.Y.S.2d 292, 294
(1975)).
186. Id. (quoting Salvaty v. Falcon Cable Television, 212 Cal. Rptr. 31, 34
(1985))).
187. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. See generally Harold Dem-
setz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW
150 (Robert C. Ellickson et al., 2d ed. 1995). Demsetz explains the emergence
of new property rights, what prompts their creation, and the corresponding
considerations that arise as a result:
Changes in knowledge result in changes in production functions,
market values, and aspirations. New techniques, new ways of doing
the same things, and doing new things-all invoke harmful and bene-
ficial effects to which society has not been accustomed .... [T]he
emergence of new property rights takes place in response to the de-
sires of the interacting persons for adjustment to new benefit-cost
possibilities.
Id.
188. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
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transportation;' 89 however, the authority granted was not
meant to open the door for largely unrelated business deals, es-
pecially if they become the predominant source of revenue
maintaining the railroad industry. 190
Critics of the litigation against telecommunications com-
panies and railroads also argue that a flexible interpretation of
railroad easements, permitting installation of fiber-optic cables,
is necessary to provide railroads with an incentive to maintain
financially burdensome rail lines. Over the past few decades,
the consumer demands on railroads have decreased, and in
fact, many routes have been eliminated due to their lack of
profitability. 191 Congress has attempted to slow this process by
requiring railroads to comply with complicated and time-
consuming abandonment procedures and with legislation, such
as Rails-to-Trails, allowing for interim uses in lieu of full aban-
donment. 192 Thus, agreements between railroad and telecom-
munications companies, if permitted, serve the interests of both
groups, providing railroads with an instant pecuniary incentive
to maintain their lines 193 and lessening the federal govern-
ment's burden of creating additional programs to encourage
preservation of the corridors. 194 However, what benefits these
entities translates into a lost economic opportunity for the
landowner and further delays the reversion of that property
back into the landowner's estate. Allowing the railroads to ex-
ploit this new subsurface use of the right-of-way land exceeds
the bounds of their easement, much like their former attempts
to profit from underground minerals. 195 The fact that the cur-
rent leasing arrangements provide a "quick fix" to problems
189. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
190. See infra notes 191-93 and accompanying text.
191. See Montange, supra note 57, at 139-40 (stating that America's rail
system has shrunk "from roughly 300,000 miles around 1920 to about 150,000
miles in 1986" and discussing how railroads have a difficult time competing
with other forms of surface transportation).
192. See supra notes 57-58; see also Bandini, supra note 13, at 2004-09.
193. Arguably, these leasing agreements with telecommunications compa-
nies may be as lucrative as mining for oil and gas. See, e.g., Buhl v. U.S.
Sprint Comm. Co., 840 S.W.2d 904, 906 (Tenn. 1992) (stating that U.S. Sprint
Communications Company agreed to pay Southern Railway Company $1,200
per mile per year for the original term of 25 years); O'Reilly, supra note 5, at
30 (observing that the railroads lease land to telecommunications companies
for as much as $25,000 per mile).
194. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
195. See discussion supra Part I.C.1.
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vexing the government and railroads does not justify the over-
shadowing of private property rights.
B. AN OWNER-ORIENTED SOLUTION
Prohibiting the railroads from engaging in such transac-
tions does not, however, imply that telecommunications com-
panies must cease using the corridors for their fiber-optic cable.
Unlike the majority of mineral rights cases that rely on the ex-
clusive nature of the railroad easements and its underlying
safety rationale to restrict concurrent use or excavation, 196 it is
apparent that the coexistence of fiber-optic cable installation
and railroad activity does not pose enough of a problem to hin-
der agreements between railroads and telecommunications
companies. Accordingly, such activities should present no more
of a threat to the operation of the rail lines if landowners take
the place of railroads in these negotiations. 197
Ideally, the controversy in the class actions filed against.
the railroads and telecommunications companies should be re-
solved in a way that facilitates the continued growth and devel-
opment of telecommunications technology, while at the same
time acknowledging the legal rights of private property owners.
One suggestion, as mentioned above, might simply be to re-
quire companies like AT&T and MCI to negotiate directly with
landowners for an interest in the railroad corridors. While this
process would maximize the rights of landowners and provide
them complete control over the decision whether to allow this
new use of their land, it could also present significant obstacles.
The appeal of the railroad corridors for use by telecommunica-
tions companies is their uninterrupted, trans-continental qual-
ity.198 Rights to all consecutive parcels must be acquired or the
overall purpose is frustrated. Thus, an individualized approach
to negotiations with telecommunications companies is inevita-
bly problematic because every landowner has veto power with
regard to his property. This reality may serve to completely
thwart the goals of the telecommunications companies because
landowners, realizing the importance of their particular seg-
ment to the project as a whole, may be tempted to exploit their
196. See supra text accompanying note 71.
197. The Eight Circuit Court of Appeals' analysis in Energy Transportation
Systems also lends support to the assertion that the landowner, rather than
the easement holder, should be the one entitled to subject the right-of-way
land to multiple easements. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
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power and hold out for the highest price. 199 Consequently, one-
on-one bargaining between telecommunications companies and
private property owners may make it too difficult to implement
new technology and its effects could be harmful to all: transac-
tion costs will increase, land-acquisition will be costly, and inef-
ficient use of resources will force consumers to pay higher
prices for what may be lower quality goods and services.2°°
Regulatory safeguards are therefore needed to prevent this
"hold out" problem. Although these safeguards may infringe
upon a property owner's absolute right to control his land,
without them, the seemingly unlimited level of control enjoyed
by the private property owner would likely eliminate railroad
corridors as a feasible option for the location of fiber-optic ca-
bles. 20' Considering this possibility, a unified, national ap-
proach is appealing. Richard Posner, an expert on the eco-
nomics of property law, suggests that granting an entity the
199. Richard Posner has written at length on this type of "hold out" prob-
lem, particularly in the context of similar endeavors by railroad or pipeline
companies:
Once the railroad.., has begun to build its line, the cost of aban-
doning it for an alternative route becomes very high. Knowing this,
people owning land in the path of the advancing line will be tempted
to hold out for a very high price-a price in excess of the opportunity
cost of the land .... Transaction costs will be high, land-acquisition
costs high, and for both reasons the right-of-way company will have to
raise the price of its services. The higher price will induce some con-
sumers to shift to substitute services. Right-of-way companies will
therefore have a smaller output; as a result they will need, and buy,
less land than they would have bought at prices equal to the opportu-
nity cost of the land. Higher land prices will also give the companies
an incentive to substitute other inputs for some of the land they
would have bought. As a result of all this, land that would have been
more valuable to a right-of-way company than to its present owners
will remain in its existing, less valuable uses, and this is ineffi-
cient ....
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYsIs OF LAW 62-63 (5th ed. 1998).
200. See id.
201. See Kristi Robbins Rezabek, Buhl v. U.S. Sprint Communications Co.:
Ascertaining Rights of Fee Owners on Whose Land a Railroad Easement Ex-
ists, 22 MEMPHIS. ST. U. L. REV. 843, 853 (1992) (commenting on the negative
ramifications of cases like Buhl which require individual landowners interests
to be taken into account). The author points out:
[C]ommunications companies like U.S. Sprint will face enormous
transaction costs in ascertaining and negotiating fair rental values for
their licenses, as well as simply determining the identities of a poten-
tial huge class of parties with whom they will be forced to deal...
[tihe natural result would seem to be a dramatic decrease in the
number of expansion projects instigated by communications compa-
nies ....
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right of eminent domain may be appropriate here: "[In settings
of high transaction costs people must be allowed to use the
courts to shift resources to a more valuable use, because the
market is by definition unable to perform this function...." 20 2
Congress vested this power in the railroads back in the 1800s
to facilitate what was viewed as a sufficient public benefit,
outweighing the rights of private landowners.2 3 Perhaps
similar federal legislation could be introduced bestowing such
privileges on telecommunications companies in recognition of
the public interest in promoting prompt implementation of new
and improved methods of communication. However, unlike the
Railroad Right-of-Way legislation of the nineteenth century,204
this legislation should include both public and private land,
and should limit right-of-way privileges to existing railroad cor-
ridors. The Florida statute2 5 discussed in Davis v. MCI Tele-
communications Corp.,20 6 essentially accomplishing these same
objectives, provides a good example of what could be imple-
mented at the federal level to allow for fiber-optic cable instal-
lation.
While this type of solution may serve the public interest
and reduce the potential for "hold out" problems, it admittedly
deprives landowners of the opportunity to make decisions re-
garding their property. Perhaps it is this unfortunate reality
that makes choosing an appropriate method of valuation and
compensation so essential. 2 7 The amount private property
owners are compensated must reflect not only the value of the
land itself, but also its potential worth as a location for fiber-
optic cables. In the case of railroad corridors, this considera-
tion of the land's "highest and best use" is likely to make a sub-
stantial difference in the amount awarded to the landowner.208
Appraisers are unlikely to find much, if any, value in long nar-
row tracts of land located so close to a railway because they are
202. POSNER, supra note 199, at 63.
203. See supra notes 14-15, 19 and accompanying text.
204. See supra note 15.
205. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
206. 606 So. 2d 734 (D. Fla. 1992).
207. See Patchen, supra note 46, at 484-85 (discussing the issue of valua-
tion in the case of a taking); see also Jennifer L. Worstell, Section 253 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996: A Permanent Appropriation of Private Prop-
erty That Must Be Justly Compensated, 50 FED. COMm. L.J. 441, 475-80 (1998)
(discussing takings valuation in the context of telecommunications right of
ways).
208. See Worstell, supra note 207, at 479.
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often noisy and unsuitable for any traditional real estate pur-
pose. However, the leasing fees collected by railroads for these
strips of land clearly illustrate their potential profitability,20 9
and the system of valuation employed must account for that.
In sum, landowners should be able to take advantage of the in-
crease in demand for their land and its new use, even in the
context of a uniform, rather than individualized, negotiation
setting.
There are several ways in which to realize this goal of pro-
tecting and adequately compensating owners of servient land.
Telecommunications companies could simply pay each land-
owner based upon the rate per mile they currently pay the rail-
road companies for the same benefit.210 The amount could be
fixed periodically by a regulatory body such as the Federal
Communications Commission 21' to avoid the type of maneu-
vering seen with the "hold out" problem. However, this method
still requires some contact with each individual owning land
along a railway, necessitating substantial time and resulting in
higher overall costs.
A system in which the telecommunications companies
could deal with fewer, larger entities is preferable. The four
principal attorneys handling the class action suits against the
telecommunications and railroad companies have proposed that
local landowners unite to form "corridor entities" allowing them
to collectively control the land and its uses.212 In addition to
the proverbial "strength in numbers" benefit of this type of ar-
rangement, such unity would make leasing of their corridors
more attractive to the telecommunication giants who could
compensate many landowners in one transaction. In turn, the
group of landowners could decide how best to allocate funds re-
ceived: distribute them proportionately, or perhaps use some of
the proceeds to promote use of their space to other telecommu-
nications companies. A tiered approach to the fixed per-mile
209. See supra note 193.
210. See, e.g., supra note 193.
211. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), an independent
agency of the United States government, was established by the Communica-
tions Act of 1934. See Federal Communications Commission (last modified
Apr. 7, 2000) <http'/www.fcc.gov/aboutus.html>. The FCC is responsible for
regulating interstate and international communications by various mediums
including radio, television, wire, satellite and cable. See id.
212. Amon, supra note 11, at A12 (indicating that the class action attor-
neys, Nels Ackerson, Henry Price, Roger Nelson and John Massopust, are cur-
rently working on patenting the "corridor entity" concept).
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rate discussed above could provide higher pay-offs to "corridor
entities," versus individuals, in exchange for the greater effi-
ciency of negotiating with these organized groups of landown-
ers.
Critics of solutions that recognize individual property
rights argue that such awards provide adjacent landowners
with a financial windfall, particularly if these individuals are
not the original grantors of the railroad easement, as is often
the case. They contend that the current landowners likely pur-
chased the property at a discount because it was burdened by
an easement and providing them with compensation for this
new use now would be unjust. However, this situation seems
no different than one in which property values significantly in-
crease due to the building of a nearby school or the develop-
ment of an adjacent shopping district: both are unexpected and
perhaps unforeseeable at the time of the original transaction,
yet it would be absurd to deny the owner the right to profit
from that increased value in subsequent business dealings.
Most importantly, the solutions presented eliminate the
railroad "middleman" and fully recognize the landowner's con-
tribution toward facilitating this new technology. Further-
more, these types of arrangements remove the incentive for
railroads to misrepresent the extent to which they rely on the
fiber-optic cable for their business, and do not constrain or de-
lay the abandonment process if rail lines are no longer profit-
able. Although this may result in renewed anxieties for the
railroads and the federal government with regard to profitabil-
ity and rail line preservation, private property rights cannot
continue to be ignored.
CONCLUSION
Historically, state and federal governments have promoted
new methods of communication and technological advance-
ments by providing grants, passing laws, or finding other justi-
fiable means to assist companies in bringing about change for
the benefit of the public. The use of railroad corridors for fiber-
optic cable installation facilitates prompt consumer access to
improved communication through efficient and effective land
use that should be encouraged. However, there is also an im-
portant need to respect private property rights and, as here,
when public interest for new technology outweighs the interest
in supporting individual liberty regarding the use of land, there
is an obligation to sufficiently compensate the landowner. A
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valuation method that reflects the true commercial desirability
of this property interest must be adopted, and the landowner,
not the railroad, is entitled to the resulting compensation.
Although it is uncertain how property owners will fair in
their class action suits against railroad and telecommunica-
tions companies, what is clear is that railroads should not be
allowed to continue profiting from third-party business deals
that are only marginally, if at all, related to railroad operation.
The outdated rationales and tenuous theories advanced to jus-
tify such action contradict the high regard traditionally placed
on individual property rights. The placement of fiber-optic ca-
bles along railroad corridors was not a use contemplated at the
time of the original railroad deeds. Instead, it represents a
novel property interest belonging to the landowner and the
railroads should not be rewarded simply because the location of
their easements is coincidentally favored by the telecommuni-
cations companies for their fiber-optic cables. It is a new era,
in terms of technology and with regard to the rights of private
landowners, and the law must find a way in this twenty-first
century to balance the importance of both.
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